Why the secret collaborator archives are important today

It's important to establish exactly who did what - and who didn't - in Poland under Soviet domination, because the Russians have the archives on the collaborators and those archives present the former KGB the opportunity for blackmail and other forms of coercion. A Polish parliamentary investigation confirmed this problem shortly after Poland's independence from Moscow.

Since many of the known files contain inaccuracies and even falsehoods, it is crucial to learn fiction from fact in the event that multiple copies of some of the files exist.

Because of the Russian intelligence dimension and the fact that Moscow's offensive espionage operations are as aggresive as they ever were during the Cold War, the issue affects not only Poland but its strategic diplomatic partners and its new military allies.

Inasmuch as the innocent deserve exoneration from false information in the archives, the guilty must not be able to hide under the guises of secrecy or indignation.

This writer wrote about the problem in his book, Secret Empire: The KGB In Russia Today (Westview, 1994):

In addition to all the KGB First Chief Directorate archives and many CPSU International Department documents, Moscow retains immense files from the internal informant and agent networks and human assets of the Communist parties and secret services of the former Warsaw Pact states.

A Polish parliamentary investigation found that throughout Central and Eastern Europe, security and intelligence service documents were destroyed at about the same time in 1989, as if coordinated from above. The documents were surreptitiously microfilmed or otherwise copied prior to being destroyed, and evidence suggests that the copies and many original files were shipped to the Soviet Union. A Czechoslovak parliamentary commission also found that many documents were copied by unknown agents prior to being destroyed.

The Soviets maintained a central database of dissidents and other 'enemies' within all Warsaw Pact member states. . . .

The SVR [Russian External Intelligence Service, the re-named KGB First Chief Directorate] has indicated that it will not cooperate with former Warsaw Pact countries to help uncover the communist agents and spies, suggesting that it plans to maintain those networks. . . . In response to a journalist's question about this issue, [SVR Director Yevgeny] Primakov responded, 'The intelligence service does not intend to provide former socialist countries with lists of its agents who worked there.'

. . . . Russia also continued to use the intelligence services of former Warsaw Pact nations and other allies. Bonn formally notified President Lech Walesa's Polish government that its intelligence organs - largely unreformed and outside civil control - were still operating against Germany.

For some reason, we are to believe that this was never a problem as Poland made its transition back toward the West, that we should ignore potential Russian threats to Poland's sovereignty and NATO's own internal security, and that those who raise concerns today are acting like "Soviets."